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Abstract
In this thesis we have considered the security of a process control system
delivered by Kongsberg Maritime. The main focus has been to look at the
threats these type of systems face from the Internet. Hence, identification of
security vulnerabilities of the system was made. The vulnerabilities found
were then attempted exploited in attacks. Possible mitigation paths to re-
move these vulnerabilities are proposed as well.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Process Control Systems (PCS) are designed to be efficient and provide time-
critical data. Traditionally security has not been a strong design factor as
performance, reliability, safety and flexibility has always been the priority.
Traditionally PCS were isolated physically and based on proprietary soft-
ware and hardware, with own communication channels. As the systems
are increasingly introduced to the Internet new possibilities opens up, as
well as new threats. Merging PCS with Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT) has several consequences. Some of the consequences are
introducing risks formally only known in ICT systems to PCS [19].
Since PCS are used to control electric utilities, petroleum (oil and gas),
water, waste, chemicals and pharmaceuticals they are part of the critical
infrastructure in the society. The consequences of cyber attacks on PCS
systems could hence have very serious consequences as they involve health
and safety of human lives, as well as having a huge impact on national and
global economy. An attack on a pharmaceutical company for example can
lead to release of hazardous substances, put human lives in danger and have
huge consequences for the environment. Therefore security of PCS is vital
in preventing this from happening.
To address and deal with the issue of security in PCS there was a Presidential
decision directive to establish the framework for protecting critical infras-
tructure in the USA. This was done in 2003, with the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace and stated that PCS systems are a national priority[24].
This is an implication that the issue described in this thesis is of great im-
portance and has to be taken seriously. Especially after the terrorist attacks
on the two towers, September 11’th 2001, the awareness of how important
the security of critical infrastructure is has increased significantly.
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1.1 Research questions
This section will present some research questions we will try to answer
throughout the thesis.
The questions are as following:
• Is it possible to get useful information about the system that can be
used in attacks later on?
• Can the system be penetrated from the Internet and in that case what
damage can an attacker do?
• What kind of security mechanisms can be found looking at the system
from an outside attacker using the Internet?
1.2 Terminology
In this section we will present some terms used in the thesis, how they are
connected together and used.
In the literature there are many terms used on the systems described and
some of them overlap in certain areas. Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is
a general term used in the industry for many types of control systems. ICS
includes Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Dis-
tributed Control Systems (DCS) and other smaller systems [17]. Both DCS
and SCADA systems are used in the industry to control distributed system
from a master location. The main difference between the two is the loca-
tion. SCADA systems are geographically spread over large areas while the
DCS usually cover systems on a plant. That is why DCS systems usually
communicate over a Local Area Network (LAN). Both SCADA and DCS
systems is a collective name and also cover PCS. From now on we will use
the term PCS instead of DCS or SCADA. The reason for this is that in our
case we are working on a scaled down PCS system.
1.3 Method
There is a need to define the scientific methodology used in this thesis.
The definition of a hypothesis along with carrying out tests to support the
hypothesis does only partly apply to our technological specialization field.
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Figure 1.1: ICS relations
The research questions defined in Section 1.1 a long with the task description
are suited as a hypothesis that has to be tested. Hypothesis testing does
not entirely cover the work done in this thesis. The Engineering method1
described by Glass [22] is more suitable in our case. The reason for that
the Engineering method is better suited in our case is that a series of tests
will be performed on the equipment provided by Kongsberg Maritime, the
results will be analyzed and improvements will be suggested. Hence not only
hypothesis testing will be done.
In the thesis background details about the protocols, ports and services
used will not be investigated in detailed depth, since the focus is on the
testing of the equipment.
1.4 Structure
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 provides background information about the system covered in
this thesis as well as similar systems. The chapter describes the develop-
ment of ICS and PCS systems regarding cyber security and the threats to
the systems. Finally the chapter covers some tools used by others to attack
ICS and PCS systems to get the scope of attack possibilities.
Chapter 3 describes the laboratory equipment. Each of the components
in the PCS system is described. In addition the tools used to carry out the
attacks are described as well along with their area of application.
1Engineering method consists of: observing a solution, propose better solutions, build
or develop, measure and analyze, repeat until no further improvements are possible.
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Chapter 4 gives an overview of the system scan. The scan is later used as
a basis for the attacks. It also defines the scope for what possibilities there
are to attack the system.
Chapter 5 covers the attacks. This chapter includes a scan that derives
information about the system. This information is then used in the attacks
described in this chapter. Both attacks done from a Internet perspective
and attacks that can be done by an insider of the system are covered here.
Chapter 6 is where the discussion is presented. The various questions
presented during the previous chapters like the research questions, ques-
tions from the attacks carried out and unanswered questions are covered in
this chapter.
Chapter 7 sums up the thesis. A conclusion is drawn based on the ex-
periences gained throughout the working process.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we will present the development of ICS and introduce the
threats that these systems face today. The importance of the topic described
throughout the thesis will be presented, which involves giving examples of
attacks done on PCS and similar types of systems. In the next section
material about the tools used in attacks carried out by others are described.
The purpose of this is to get an overview of the work done by others and
use this information to try similar tests in our laboratory, if possible. The
attacks done by others can also give ideas on approaches to try that has not
been done before or adjust known methods to our purpose.
2.1 Development and threats
In the early days of SCADA and PCS serial communication was used. Be-
cause of the limitations of this technology, such as low channel capacity,
only the most vital information used to keep control over the systems were
exchanged and there were almost no attention to security of the information.
The information was sent in clear text and the remote devices accepted it
without any kind of authentication. This lack of security did not pose major
problems because the ICS were isolated.
As the ICT developed and new technologies were introduced other possi-
bilities became available. The new information exchange technologies were
better in regards to the amounts of information exchanged. There were
many products capable of the information exchange, yet few that actually
were applicable to the rigorous field conditions or were suited for industrial
application. The adaptation of the Ethernet technology became increasing
for indoor industrial fields. As for the outdoor technologies other factors had
to be taken into account such as temperature variations, power consumption
and the range of the information exchange. For example, the information
exchange had to be tested in temperature variations spanning from -30◦C
to +60◦C. The power consumed had to be as low as possible, since most oil
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and gas systems run on solar and battery powered systems [21].
The technology evolution lead to application of various technologies in
ICS dependent on the industrial environment and needs. Today the infor-
mation is exchanged through Ethernet, wireless, shared leased lines, and
even the Internet [31]. These communication channels are inhomogeneous
and less isolated than the original ICS systems were. The mixing and lack of
isolation of communication channels poses a serious threat to ICS because
forgery and control loss now pose a new threat.
The adaptation of previously isolated ICS to the new communication
channels such as wireless, shared leased lines and the Internet, as well as
adaptation of Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products such as Microsoft
Windows has many advantages, but it has also created threats previously
unknown to these systems. Now ICS has to face common cyber attacks
which means that the focus has to be increased on security measures. In
contrast to ordinary ICT systems such as personal computers (PC) the se-
curity breach in ICS does not only result in a compromise of the security on
the individual computer, but it can result in loss of service to utility cus-
tomers, financial loss to service providers due to damaged equipment and
corruption of metering information, and finally environmental damage and
potential loss of human lives [19]. In the next section this topic is contin-
ued and examples of security breaches along with their consequences are
described.
2.2 Importance of the topic
Like mentioned in the first chapter the PCS are part of the critical infras-
tructure in the society. Protection of them is a very important issue. To
stress this point we will show examples of things that can occur if security
in PCS and similar systems is breached.
2003 was the worst year for viruses until then, according to the F-Secure
website 1. There were several major worms and viruses that had very big
impact on the ICT industry and hence also on ICS. Amongst them two had
especial impact on the power grid network.
The first one was the Slammer worm. On January 25th the worm began
hitting computer networks around the world. It was the biggest worm attack
on the Internet ever with the worm trying to hit all possible addresses on
the Internet (theoretically 4 billion) in less than 15 minutes 1. It exploited
a vulnerability in the Microsoft SQL database. The computers that were
not patched for the vulnerability got affected by the worm. Amongst many
others the worm spread to a nuclear power plant in Ohio, USA. The breach
did not pose a safety hazard since the plant was oﬄine but just the fact
1The annual reports can be found on http://www.f-secure.com/en_EMEA/security/
security-lab/latest-threats/security-threat-summaries/2003.html
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that the virus got into the system is a major security breach. The virus
got into the plant through an unsecured corporate network connected to
the plants network and infected at least one of the plants unpatched SQL
servers. Administrators were not even aware that there was a patch, which
Microsoft released six months before Slammer struck. The virus overloaded
the plants network by continuously trying to spread leading to malfunction
of the plants monitoring system controlling various parts of the plant, such
as the coolant systems, core temperature sensors, and external radiation
sensors. Many of those continue to require careful monitoring even while a
plant is oﬄine [30].
The second worm that had major impact on the power grid in 2003 was
the Blaster worm. Blaster utilized known vulnerabilities in the Microsoft
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) protocol [14] and slowed down the commu-
nication links on the ICS. This prevented real-time data from reaching the
control centers and they did not know about a generator and multiple line
failures. The lack of control lead to a cascade of blackouts along the north
east coast of the USA and Canada [25].
These two incidents along with many similar ones caused by the Slam-
mer and Blaster worms are examples of how vulnerable parts of the critical
infrastructure such as the power grid can be for these types of malicious
attacks.
Not only worms are affecting the ICS. There are also security breaches
done by foreign agencies. On the 8th of April 2009 an article was posted
in the Wall Street Journal describing espionage attempted by Chinese and
Russian spies on the power grid of the USA [23]. According to the article the
attackers tried to map the power grid and left software that can be activated
during times of crisis or war to disrupt the function of the grid.
Disgruntled ex-employees pose a major threat as well. In 1992 a disgrun-
tled former employee hacked into Chevron Corporation’s emergency alert
network and disabled the alert system. This was not noticed until an acci-
dental chemical release 10 hours later in a Chevron refinery in Richmond.
During this time the emergency alert system in 22 states was not function-
ing and thousands of lives were potentially in danger if an emergency had
occurred [16]. According to FBI and the Computer Security Institute on
Cybercrime, released in 2000 over 71% of the security breaches carried out
on ICS were done by insiders [13]
Table 2.1 shows an overview of various threats to the ICS with a short
description of each one.
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Threat source: Description:
Attackers
Attackers break into the systems for the
thrill of the challenge or to brag about it
in hacker communities. As tools have become
more available to the public and more
sophisticated these types of attacks are
becoming more frequent. Isolated attacks
may have serious consequences.
Bot-network operators
Bot-network operators are attackers that have
control of several systems and can attack in a coor-
dinated fashion. Sometimes the services of compro-
mised systems are available for purchase in under-
ground communities (like denial of service attacks,
spam or fishing attacks)
Criminal groups
Criminal groups seek profit from attacking systems
(usually in the form of money). Especially orga-
nized crime groups use various approaches (like
spam, phishing, spyware/malware) to achieve their
goal of profit.
Foreign intelligence
Foreign intelligence use various tools for informa-
tion gathering. This can be later be used to disrupt
vital parts of the critical infrastructure in case of
military actions or political confrontations.
Insiders
Insiders such as disgruntled employees or for-
mer employees have unique system knowledge.
Through their experience and access to the inner
parts of the system they can cause damage to the
system or outsource information. Intentional im-
pact from insiders are the most common threat
source.
Terrorists
Terrorists aim to destroy or incapacitate critical
infrastructure such as ICS. The goal is usually to
threaten national security, cause massive casualties
and weaken the public morale.
Table 2.1: Threats to ICS
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2.3 Tools used by others
We will divide this section in two and look at tools that are used to make a
survey of a system and tools that are used after the information is gathered
by the survey tools and attack a system using that information.
There are various tools used to make a survey of a system. Table 2.2 shows
some of the survey tools used by others, a description of each tool and a
reference to the material this is based upon.
Regarding the attack tools used by others, there are very many to choose
Tool name: Description: Reference:
Nmap
Nmap is a free and open source
tool for network exploration or
security auditing. It can do port
scans on large networks as well as
single hosts. A port scan is used
to specify services running on a
host. Packet filter and firewalls
can also be detected.
[9] [28] [33]
IP Stack
Integrity Checker
The integrity checker can exer-
cise the stability of an IP Stack
and its component stacks such as
TCP, UDP, ICMP etc. It gener-
ates piles of pseudo random pack-
ets of the target protocol and the
packets can be configured to pen-
etrate the firewall rules or find
bugs in the IP stack.
[5] [33]
Ethereal
Ethereal is a open source net-
work protocol analyzer that al-
lows monitoring of communica-
tions between components. The
communication can be analyzed
to find the communicating parts,
encryption used, information ex-
changed etc.
[4] [28]
Table 2.2: Survey tools used by others
from. The tools can be very specific, as well as very general with a lot of
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adjustment options. Table 2.3 shows some of the tools used by others that
can be relevant in our case:
Tool name: Description: Reference:
iOpener
Identifies every unit in a SCADA
system and is able to control
it without authorization of the
main control unit.
[29]
Metasploit
Metasploit framework is used for
developing, testing and the use of
exploit code on various systems.
It is described in greater detail in
Section 3.2
[6] [28]
Hydra
Is a fast network logon cracker.
Hydra supports numerous proto-
cols and it is known to be flexible,
as well as fast.
[10] [33]
Fuzzers
Fuzzers are used for sending in-
valid input to an application to
force abnormal behavior. The
behavior can be studied to find
vulnerabilities. Fuzzers can be
configured with wide range of in-
formation sent.
[28]
Netwox
A suite of tools for various pur-
poses such as e.g. spoofing and
brute forcing. It is described in
greater detail in Section 3.2
[26]
Wikto
Wikto is a tool used for server
assessment. More information
about it can be found in the de-
scription below.
[27]
Table 2.3: Attack tools used by others
The tool iOpener is used by Langer Communications with Ralph Langner
as a representative. When he has problems with convincing asset owners
about how important security is he runs iOpener on the asset owners sys-
tems. According to an article in the Digital Bond the program identifies
every Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) in a SCADA system and is
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able to control it by i.e. turning it on and off.[29] In practice this means
that you can control various parts of the systems like i.e. engines, ventila-
tion system, pressure units and so on remotely without authorization from
the main controller unit. This is very alarming from a security perspective.
This would be very interesting to try on our system, even though it is a
PCS system, not a SCADA system. The similarities may be sufficient for it
to work. The article also mentions that iOpener is made to not be vendor
specific and works on equipment from several vendors.
Wikto is a tool used for server assessment. It is based on Nikto which is
a server scanner but Wikto also has additional features such as brute force
fuzzing, basic web server directory crawling and Google hacks to identify
poor protection [27]. Even though there is no connection to a server in our
system, the laboratory may have similar weaknesses as an web server and
hence pose a threat if the vulnerabilities are exploited.
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Chapter 3
Equipment
The equipment in the laboratory is delivered by Kongsberg Maritime. It has
to be noted that this equipment is for laboratory purposes, so the system
is a small part of the whole system. The laboratory system may also not
correspond with the system used by Kongsberg Maritime in regards to the
security mechanisms used. The live system used has higher requirements
regarding security than the laboratory system has.
Figure 3.1: System overview
21
3.1 Laboratory equipment
The laboratory equipment consists of several units. The core unit is the Pro-
cess Station (PS) AIM 1000 Albatross. It controls several components like
an engine component, pressure valves and several other parts and sensors.
The PS gathers information from the components and sensors continuously.
In a full scale system there can be several PS stations scattered across the
production plant to gather information on nearby machinery.
The Operator Station (OS) is using the operative system Windows Xp
with Service Pack 2. OS exchanges data with the PS on various components
and sensors. Through this communication the OS has continuous control
over the units. The communication is exchanged through standard Ether-
net with UDP being the main data carrier. Connections between all the
components are wired with TP cables. The program used on the OS for
control of the PS is AIM 2000. AIM 2000 displays an overview over various
parts of the system along with the ability to simulate system behavior. We
will limit ourselves to looking at the use of the analog and digital I/O of
the PS controlled by the OS in this report. The control of the I/O is done
through AIM 2000. The limitation is done because we are only working on
an engine component. The choice of that component is based on the fact
that it is easy to determine if it is turned on or not and in our case if the
attack is successful or not. Other components connected to the PS could
be used but could be harder to observe. The firewall used in the system is
a hardware firewall. There is a software firewall in the OS as well but it
was turned off for the purpose of this testing because the properties were
configured in advance by the NTNU staff to not permit any communication
with the outside world (which in this case is the rest of the NTNU network).
The complete overview of the system is shown in Figure 3.1.
The OS has 3 network cards. One is used for network A (with the
IP address 172.21.101.1). The second one is used for network B (with the
IP address 172.22.101.1). The corresponding IP addresses for the PS are
hence 172.21.100.1 on network A and 172.22.100.1 on network B. By listen-
ing (sniffing) on the information exchanged between OS and PS we deter-
mine that all the traffic is sent on a “virtual” network AB with the address
172.23.101.1 (and 172.23.100.1 for the PS interface). This is a reliability
mechanism for the system. If one of the hubs (displayed in Figure 3.1)
starts to malfunction or has to be shut down for some reason, the other one
can continue the packet exchange and keep the system running. The last
network card is used for network ADM. It has assigned a local IP address
10.122.10.5. The hardware firewall significantly limits the traffic through the
ADM interface to the NTNU network and Internet. Only addresses with the
NTNU address space of 129.241.—.— are allowed and all other addresses
are unreachable. The hardware firewall also contains a Network Address
Translator (NAT). NAT translates from local address space e.g. 10.122.10.5
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to a 129.241.187.83 (NTNU address space). Due to the fact that the firewall
was set up by NTNU and is not part of the laboratory system the security
testing of the system will be done by an attacker on the inside of the firewall.
Consequences of an attacker on the inside of the firewall will be covered in
the discussion chapter. The IP address of the attacker is 10.122.10.3, which
means that he is on the same subnet as the OS and can correspond with it
easily. A detailed overview of the system is shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: System overview with details
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3.2 Security testing tools used
Below is a list of programs used. They are commonly available, multi plat-
form and tailored for different purposes.
Cain & Abel
Cain & Abel is mainly a password recovery tool. It can recover passwords by
sniffing the network, cracking encrypted passwords using Dictionary, Brute-
Force and Cryptanalysis attacks, recording VoIP conversations, decoding
scrambled passwords, revealing password boxes, uncovering cached pass-
words and analyzing routing protocols [1].
Colasoft Packet Builder
The Packet Builder is used for altering packets. It displays a clear interface
of what the packet content is and enables a user to alter different param-
eters of the packet. When the modification of the parameters is made the
program calculates and attaches a new checksum on the end [2].
Colasoft Packet Player
This program is used for packet replay. It can open captured packets and
trace files, then replay them back to the network. In our case we used Wire-
shark (described below) to capture the packets and Colasoft for the replay
[3].
Metasploit
Metasploit is a framework for developing, testing and using exploit code
consisting of various tools. This allows various use for developers, testers
and administrators to see if their systems are properly secured. Security
researchers use it as well to find and expose flaws. The framework contain
320 exploit modules.
The use of Metasploit is usually done in two stages. First you select the
exploit you want to use. The exploits are sorted by operating system, type
of service or protocol and finally the version where the exploit can be used.
An example is Windows/SMB/ms_08_067_netapi which exploits a flaw
in the windows operating system, using the Server Message Block (SMB)
which is an application-level network protocol used for sharing access files,
printers and serial ports. Finally the ms_08_067_netapi exploits a flaw in
the servers path stack corruption in version _08_067.
The second stage in using Metasploit is selection of the payload. This
payload is basically the attack method you want to use. If you have an
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exploit of a stack overflow e.g. then you can select to insert a command
shell payload in the overflowed stack to try to control the targeted com-
puter through this shell. Other settings has to be selected in the payload
as well, such as the protocol this attack will run over (e.g. TCP) and the
version of the underlying protocol (e.g. IPv6) [6].
Nessus
Nessus is a vulnerability scanner. It used to be open source program until
2005 when they closed the source code and made a license. There is a free
but limited “Home Feed´´ license available. Despite this it is still the lead-
ing vulnerability testing program with over 20,000 plugins, security checks
and scripting language support for writing you own plugins according to
sectools.org [7].
Newag and Netwox
Netwox is a toolbox containing 222 tools. There are various tools regard-
ing packet sniffing, scanning, brute forcing, tampering (spoofing) and many
more. The tools can be run over various protocols like TCP, UDP, Address
Resolution Protocol (ARP)1 etc. The toolbox is oriented towards system
administrators. Netwag is the graphical user interface for Netwox [8].
TightVNC viewer
TightVNC is a client software used for testing of the VNC connection.
TightVNC enables to setup of a connection to a remote VNC server. After
the connection is set up a desktop view of the controlled machine is achieved,
as well as control of its mouse and keyboard with the mouse and keyboard
of the connecting client [11].
Wireshark
Wireshark is a packet sniffing program that can be used for analysis and
protocol development. This program was the most useful tool in our case.
It captured network traffic and saved it for analysis. Filtering of the saved
traffic was also done in this program to match our specifics and use. The
analysis of the protocol was simplified by the use of Wireshark [12].
1ARP is used for finding the hardware address when only the IP address is known.
25
Chapter 4
System scan
4.1 Nessus scan
Nessus was used to map the vulnerabilities of the laboratory delivered by
Kongsberg Maritime. The results and settings of the tests were as follows.
Purpose: The purpose of this scan was to find weaknesses in the system
that can be exploited in other attacks. By finding a possible weakness or
several weaknesses, an attacker can try to exploit them. The scan can also
give ideas for similar attacks of a different kind. By executing a scan more
information about the system can be obtained. A scan gives information
about the system used, open ports, protocols used and possible weaknesses
that can be found with regard to the information found about the system.
System state prior to attack: OS and PS are both turned on and func-
tional but without any processes being run. The Engine is not running.
Nessus was configured to use 5 of the 6 possible port scanners like shown
in Figure 4.1. The LaBrea tarpitted hosts check was not used due to the fact
that it is designed to be a honey pot for attackers and malicious programs
such as worms and viruses. A PCS system of this kind, such as the one
tested, should not have anything that attracts attackers or malicious soft-
ware and hence the test is pointless. A LaBrea honeypot is frequently used
in Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to catch and hold on to attackers.
All the plugins available in the “home version” of Nessus were set to be
tested. The reason for this was that all weak spots of the system should be
discovered. A option for thorough tests was also set in the options to make
them as complete as possible.
All the screenshots along with an explanation of the settings in Nessus
are shown in Appendix B as they are a bit too detailed to be shown in this
Section.
There were problems with finding the IP address of the OS from the
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Figure 4.1: Options set in Nessus
outside of the hardware firewall. These problems are described in Appendix
A
Attack procedure:
1. Connect to the same subnet as the OS (10.122.10.3).
2. Configure Nessus to look for known vulnerabilities.
3. Listen to the OS IP address (10.122.10.5)
note: In Nessus there are plugins that are simple programs which checks
for a given flaw. There are currently 24525 different plugins in total that are
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used by Nessus. The full version with extended plugins is called Profession-
alFeed and costs $1200 per year, but because of limited resources only the
HomeFeed could be used in our case. HomeFeed lacks many of the features
like “Configuration Auditing”, “Sensitive Data Auditing” and “SCADA plu-
gins” which could have been very useful in our case since PCS systems have
similarities to SCADA systems. Still, despite not using the ProfessionalFeed
with all the possibilities it gives, we got various results on the scans.
second note: The reason for connecting to the same subnet as the intended
target scanned is that in this case the firewall hardware will cause limita-
tions on the vulnerabilities scanned from the other side of it. This will lead
to a incomplete view of the scan in regards to the visible vulnerabilities but
may be more realistic in regards to attacking the system from the outside.
Result: The general results are shown in Figure 4.2 showing the scan time,
the IP address of the scanned OS, number of open ports and the number of
vulnerabilities connected to the open ports a long with a level of seriousness
for the vulnerabilities. All the details of the scan (and configuration of the
scan) were considered too large and are placed in Appendix B. The essence
of the information gathered by Nessus for the OS are shown below:
Vulnerabilities1:
Figure 4.2: Nessus scan overview
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1. It is possible to bypass the software firewall rules.
2. The OS can be controlled remotely.
3. Various information can be obtained using a NetBIOS request.
4. A user can log on through Windows Terminal Services.
5. The OS implements TCP timestamps.
6. Identification of the operating system used could be made.
7. Access to files, printers, etc between nodes on a network is possible.
8. It is possible to log on using a guest account or null session.
9. A file transfer protocol is active, which can pose a threat.
10. Two protocols that are in use enable exact time determination.
11. HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) information was collected.
12. Information on the HTTP web server in use gathered.
Vulnerability description:
1. Since the TCP synchronizing (SYN) packets with the FIN flag are able
to pass the firewall an intruder can bypass the software firewall by
setting the FIN and SYN flags on a packet and establish a connection
on the other side of the firewall. The firewall passes the packets since
the FIN flag is set and the connection is made on the other side since
the receiver acknowledges that this is a SYN packet and a connection
has to be made.
2. The OS is running a Virtual Network Computing (VNC) server permit-
ting a console to be displayed remotely. The VNC enables possibilities
of remote control of the OS but at the same time creates a security
vulnerability. A weak username and password can be used as a basis
for an attack on the VNC server by brute force guessing or dictionary
attacks.
3. Information about the OS was collected using a NetBIOS nbtscan
requests. The information collected is shown in Figure 4.3 and contains
information such as computer name, domain name and even the Media
Access Control (MAC) address of the network card. The MAC address
is the physical address of the hardware and can uniquely identify each
node on the network.
1Sorted by seriousness. Some of the vulnerabilities found by Nessus were left out
because they were insignificant
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4. Terminal Services allows a Windows user to remotely obtain a graph-
ical login (and therefore act as a local user on the remote host). An
attacker may use this service to mount a dictionary attack against the
OS to try to log in remotely. This service is vulnerable to Man-in-the-
middle attacks and an attacker can steal the credentials of legitimate
users by impersonating the Windows server.
5. The TCP timestamps implemented have a side effect which is that the
uptime of the remote host can sometimes be computed.
6. Identification of the operating system used was possible. This was
possible with a confidence level of 99%. The operating system used on
the OS was Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2.
7. CIFS (Common Internet File System) is used to provide shared access
to files, printers, etc between nodes on a network. There are known
viruses and worms that exploit the protocol used by CIFS for a mali-
cious purpose.
8. Since the OS is running a Windows based operation system it is pos-
sible to log on using the guest account, a NULL session (also know
as anonymous users) or valid account information. The information
about the account log in possibilities is shown in Figure 4.4.
9. TFTPD (Trivial File Transfer Protocol) is in use. TFTPD is often
used by routers and diskless hosts to retrieve their configuration. Un-
fortunately it is also used by worms to propagate.
10. The OS responds to an Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
time stamp. This makes it possible for an attacker to determine the
exact time and date of the OS. This may help him to defeat all your
time based authentication protocols.
11. Network Time Protocol (NTP) is in use. It provides information about
the current date and time of the OS and may provide system informa-
tion.
12. Some information on the HTTP configuration could be extracted. The
collected information is shown in Figure 4.5.
In addition information on the HTTP web server type and version.
The results were that the OS is using a HTTP web server of the type:
SentinelProtectionServer/7.1
Pending issues: Can we exploit this? If we can, then how?
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Figure 4.3: Information collected through a NetBIOS request
Figure 4.4: Account log in possibilities
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Port Number
/and Protocol: Description of port service:
69/UDP
The OS is running a TFTPD which is often used
by routers and diskless hosts to retrieve their con-
figuration.
123/UDP
An NTP server is listening on this port, which en-
ables exact determination of the date and time con-
figured on the OS.
135/TCP The OS is running a Windows RPC service whichreplies to Bind Requests.
137/UDP The OS listens on port 137 and replies to NetBIOSnbtscan requests.
139/TCP An SMB server is listening on this port.
445/TCP This port is used for file and resource sharing onWindows 2000, Xp and 2003.
3389/TCP
Terminal Services on the OS are turned on, which
allows a Windows user to remotely obtain a graph-
ical login (and therefore act as a local user on the
remote host).
5800/TCP A VNC server is listening on this port. VNC allowsusers to control the host remotely.
5900/TCP
A VNC server is listening on this port as well. The
difference is that port 5800 is listening for a web
server enabling the use of the HTTP protocol.
6002/TCP A web server is running on this port.
7000/TCP Afs fileserver is in use on this port.
7001/TCP Callback to the cache managers is in use on thisport.
7777/TCP Cbt services are in use on this port.
Table 4.1: Open ports on OS
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Figure 4.5: HTTP information
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Chapter 5
Attacks
This Chapter contains the attacks and tests carried out on the system.
Each attack is structured by a description of the purpose, preliminary state
of the system, the method used, the results and pending issues that present
themselves after an attack. Most of the attacks tried are based on the system
scan in the previous chapter and the possibilities it gives. The following
Sections describe both the successful and unsuccessful attacks carried out
from a Internet perspective called “Outsider” perspective and an perspective
of an insider of the system called “Insider”. The finishing Section sums up
the attacks.
5.1 Attacks from the outside
The remainder of this chapter will be structured like shown in Figure 5.1.
The attacks carried out are divided into attacks that can be done by a person
that has access to the inside of the system e.g. an employee and attacks that
can be carried out by a person that only has external access to the system
e.g. terrorists, criminal groups etc. This division is done because an insider
has different resources available than an external attacker, as well as the fact
that inside attacks are the most common threat source to PCS, as described
in the background Section 2.2.
Attacks from the outside of the system are very common in COTS like
Microsoft Windows as well as other operating systems. Since COTS and
PCS are merging the possible attacks are transferred to PCS as described
in the background Section 2.1.Hence the attacks possible on COTS are also
possible on PCS. These attacks will be described in greater detail in the
following Subsections. When looking at this PCS system from the outside
perspective the only visible component that is suitable to carry out attack
on is the OS. The reason for this is that it has three network cards and
information cannot be passed through to the two network cards that are
connected to the PS without tampering with the OS. The attacks from the
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Figure 5.1: Remaining chapter division
outside perspective assume that no tampering with the OS has been done in
advance. That is why the main part of the outsider attacks are focused on
the OS. Although if an attacker gets control over the OS, tampering with
the remainder of this PCS system can be done easily since the OS controls
the other units.
5.1.1 Successful outsider attack: Gain control over the OS
Purpose: The main purpose of this attack is to gain control over the OS. If
the control is gained we will explore the possibilities available for an attacker.
To carry out this attack we will use some of the information previously col-
lected by the Nessus scan.
System state prior to attack: OS running in idle mode.
Attack procedure:
• Run Metasploit Framework
• Search for Microsoft Windows Xp, Service Pack 2 vulnerabilities.
• Compare the available vulnerabilities found to the used services, open
ports and vulnerabilities found in the Nessus scan.
• A match was found on SMB services and file and folder sharing.
• Configure Metasploit as follows1:
– use windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi exploit.
1background on the Metasploit configuration is described in more detail in Section 3.2.
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– set RHOST 10.122.10.5 (Remote host ip which is the OS ip in
this case).
– set RPORT 445 (port number on the host to connect to).
– set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/bind_tcp (Listens for a con-
nection, injects the meterpreter server DLL for remote control of
the OS).
– set TARGET 0 (to make Metasploit detect the OS, or 3 to set it
to Xp Sp2 english).
– exploit (to start the execution of the program).
• pwd command was used to show working directory, which is C:\WINDOWS\system32
by default.
• directory was changed to D:\ as displayed in Figure 5.2.
• sysinfo command was used to get information about the system and
the results are displayed in Figure 5.3.
• download command was used to download a text file from the OS.
• cat command could be used to display the text file in the command
window as well.
• terminated session.
Result: This attack gives the attacker the freedom to do whatever he or
she wants. By configuring the Metsploit framework in a correct manner an
attacker can virtually do anything he or she pleases through this attack.
The exploited vulnerability enables both unlimited access to information
about the system such as network adapters, operative system info, processes
running, file system and registry amongst others, as well as execution and
modification of these things. An attacker can e.g. remotely shut down the
OS, execute a command on it, terminate processes, upload and download
files etc.
Figure 5.2 displays the command window and the file system on disk
D: along with information about file names, sizes and access rights. Figure
5.3 displays the information shown upon executing the sysinfo command.
All the network cards on the OS are displayed with name, MAC address,
IP address and nettmask. Even the virtual network adapter that uses the
network adapters with IP 172.21.101.1 and 172.22.101.1 is displayed here.
The details of this virtual adapter are described by Szostak [34].
Pending issues: How do we protect the system against these types of
attacks?
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Figure 5.2: Directory displayed through Metasploit attack
5.1.2 Successful outsider attack: Denial of Service (DoS) on
OS
Purpose: The purpose of this attack is to make the OS unavailable. This is
done by sending more communications requests to the OS than it is able to
handle. By doing this an attacker prevents legitimate users and units from
using the system or makes the system so overloaded that it is practically
impossible to communicate with it.
System state prior to attack: OS running in idle mode.
Attack procedure: To carry out this attack the laboratory system was
changed a bit. The change was done to be able to listen on the communi-
cation link between the attacking pc and the OS. Instead of a switch (as
in the original set up of the system) a hub was used. A hub broadcasts
every packet to all the ports on the hub, while a switch only sends packets
on the port intended for the receiver. That is why a hub is much easier to
eavesdrop on than a switch. The changed setup is displayed in Figure 5.4
Once the laboratory set up was changed a bit the attack procedure was
carried out as follows:
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Figure 5.3: System info displayed through Metsploit
• Wireshark was started up on an eavesdropper pc to listen to the traffic
between the OS and the attacker.
• Netwag toolbox2 was set up on the attackers pc with the following
configuration:
– Synflood tool was used.
– Destination IP was set to 10.122.10.5.
– Destination port was set to 139 since it uses the TCP protocol.
– The attack was initialized.
Background for the attack: A normal client-server running over the TCP
protocol usually exchanges a series of messages. The client sends a synchro-
nize message to the server. The server replies by an acknowledge message.
Then the client sends an acknowledgement message as well. The exchange
is called a three-way handshake and is commonly used as a basis in the
TCP protocol. This DoS attack exploits this. The first two packets are
sent, but the acknowledge message from the client is not sent. The lack of
acknowledgement message from the client creates a half open connection on
the server side which consumes resources on the server. If the client contin-
ues to send synchronize messages over time all of the servers resources are
consumed [18]. The half open connection is illustrated in Figure 5.5.
Result: In this attack a flooding tool was used that exploits the half open
2Netwag is described in more detail in the equipment chapter
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Figure 5.4: DoS attack setup
connections in the TCP protocol. The tool sets the SYN (synchronize) flag
on each TCP request but in addition to not answering the SYN-ACK pack-
ets the Synflood tool makes fake IP source addresses (spoofs the addresses)
for the sent packets so that the OS (which in this case is the server) sends
the SYN-ACK messages to a fake address. The attacker sends packets in
a very fast sequence and within 3-4 seconds the CPU usage on the OS is
100%. This CPU utilization leads to very slow responses on the OS and
after some time it hangs for several seconds. In this test we were not able to
force the OS to a complete halt but if this attack was carried out by several
attackers at the same time (which is called a Distributed Denial of Service
[DDoS] attack) it may have been possible. An overview over the traffic on
the hub is shown in Figure 5.6. One thing that is worth noticing is the time
and amount of packets sent. During 42.5 seconds over 100000 packets were
sent to the OS. Another thing that is worth noticing is that the Synflood
tool generates fake random source addresses.
Like mentioned earlier the CPU on the OS overloaded and working on
100% capacity after only 3-4 seconds due to the enormous amounts of half
open connections created. The main process responsible for the overload
was a System process running on the OS. The start of the attack along with
the CPU usage history is shown in Figure 5.7.
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Figure 5.5: DoS attack exchange
Pending issues: How can we protect the system against this type of
attack?
5.1.3 Unsuccessful outsider attack: Unsuccessful Metasploit
attempts
Purpose: Exploit vulnerabilities using Metasploit framework. Although
there was a successful attack using Metasploit from an outsiders perspective
on the system, several of the other exploits that were tried did not give any
results.
System state prior to attack: OS running in idle mode.
Attack procedure: Like in the successful Metasploit attack the proce-
dure for this attack was to match possible Nessus vulnerabilities and open
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Figure 5.6: DoS attack traffic
ports to the Metasploit exploits. The following exploits were tried:
• Since the version of the TFTPD running on the OS could not be
determined the three exploits regarding TFTPD had to be tried, which
were the following:
– AT-TFTP v1.9 exploit.
– TFTPD32 version 2.21 exploit.
– TFTPDWIN threaded TFTP Server exploit.
• Buffer overflow in NTP.
• SMB authentication requests.
• VNC remote desktop server.
• Windows Xp with Service Pack 2.
Result: Regarding the TFTPD running on the OS the reason for the attacks
being unsuccessful may be that the version running on the OS is different
than the version were the exploitation was possible.
SMB authentication requires that the user of the OS authenticates by
clicking on the path (which is \\Server\Share). This can be embedded in
a link on a web page or an email. This resembles a fishing attack where
an attacker is forging a legitimate site to force the target to enter sensitive
information that is sent to the attacker or click on a page that has mali-
cious motives. This attack on SMB was unsuccessful because the connection
through SMB could not be established.
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VNC remote desktop attack was tried by trying to exploit the weakness
in the RPC protocol that the blaster exploited in 2003 (as described in the
background chapter 2.2)but the system is patched up enough to prevent this
type of attacks.
Various attacks regarding exploitation of vulnerabilities for Windows XP
with Service Pack 2 were also tried through Metasploit but there were lim-
ited results. The only vulnerability that could be successfully exploited was
the one described in Subsection 5.1.1.
Pending issues: Are there other Metasploit attacks that could work?
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Figure 5.7: CPU usage on the OS
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5.2 Attacks from the inside
On this PCS there are numerous vulnerabilities that an inside attacker can
exploit. Some of the vulnerabilities are presented in the previous Section
4.1. An insider has different premises than an attacker from the outside. In
this system an inside attacker bypasses the hardware firewall and has much
easier access to system resources. The successful and unsuccessful attacks
carried out from the insider perspective will be described in details in the
two next following Subsections.
5.2.1 Successful insider attack: VNC server access for the
OS
Purpose: The VNC enables remote control of the OS like mentioned in
Section 4.1. With insider access to the OS the password enabling the access
to the VNC can be broken. If the password is compromised anyone can get
remote control over the OS and then also the whole PCS system.
System state prior to attack: OS running in normal operational mode.
Attack procedure: Based on the Nessus scan we know that a VNC server
port is listening on port 5900 over the TCP protocol.
• An insider uses gets access to the registry of the OS.
• The insider fetches the hashed password for VNC which is stored in the
registry in: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\
Password (the hashed password is stored in hexadecimals with the
total of 8 bytes, but due to privacy reasons could not be given in this
thesis).
• Cain & Abel program is used, password cracking is enabled and the
hashed password found in the registry is used as input in the VNC-
3DES password cracker, which creates an output password: ********.
• The output passwords authenticity has to be verified. TightVNC
viewer client is used to connect to the OS remotely with the host
IP address: 10.122.10.5, port number: 5900 and password: ********.
Result: The attack is successful and a new window comes up enabling
remote control over the OS with a real-time view and control over the mouse
pointer, keyboard and a view of what is seen on the screen. This enables
control of the OS and hence the whole PCS system in this case. Turning
the engine unit on remotely using this type of attack was not a problem.
The main vulnerability that is exploited in this attack is that the stored
VNC password is encrypted using triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES)
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and stored in the registry. DES and 3DES has known weaknesses that the
program Cain & Abel utilizes to decrypt the password. One of the main
purposes of a hash is that it has to be irreversible and hence a password
should not be found if only the hash value of the password is available. Due
to the weaknesses of 3DES the plaintext password corresponding to the hash
value can be found using Cain & Abel. More details about the use of Cain
& Abel is found in Appendix B.2
In practice remote control can also be easily discovered because control
of the mouse and keyboard is lost but if the attack is done when the OS
operator is away the attack may not be so easily discovered. Access to the
registry of the OS is also usually not something an employee has, but if the
administrator makes a simple mistake by not turning the OS of or restrict-
ing the access to it in a physical way an employee might just get hold of
the hashed VNC password. Then by using the method described above the
employee might get total control over the system. Figure 5.8 shows remote
control over the OS using VNC and if the I/O value of the motor is changed
it turns the engine on and off remotely.
Pending issues: How do we protect the OS against these types of attacks?
Figure 5.8: Remote control of OS using VNC
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5.2.2 Successful insider attack: Packet replay through a switch
Purpose: This attack is based on packet replay. Packets sent between the
OS and PS are captured by an attacker. Then the attacker sends the same
packets to see if it is possible to recreate the same behavior of the system.
For this purpose the engine unit is used and the packets sent from the OS
to PS are tried captured, then replayed. The engine is used due to the fact
that it is easy to see if the replay attack is successful or not because it is
turned on or off.
Basis: The basis for this attack is that it was tried by Szostak [34] on
this system in the previous semester. One of the topics that are relevant is
if this type of replay attack will work on a switch instead of hubs used in
this setup. A switch would be more realistic in a PCS used in the industry,
hence this type of attack would be more probable in a real life setup. The
setup of the system in this type of attack is shown in Figure 5.9.
System state prior to attack: The OS and PS are both turned on
Figure 5.9: Insider attack
and functional but without any processes being run. The Engine is not run-
ning either.
Attack procedure:
1. Substitute the switch on net A with a hub and listen (sniff) to the
traffic with Wireshark.
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2. Turn the engine on and off using the OS.
3. Change the substituted hub back to a switch.
4. Filter the packets and sort out the packets turning the engine on and
off and save them.
5. Disconnect the OS from the internal network
6. Use Colasoft packet player to replay the captured packets over the
switch on net A.
Result: The attack is successful. An attacker is able to turn the engine
on and off but there are a few assumptions that has to be made here. As
described by Szostak [34] there are security mechanisms in the OS preventing
replay attacks to some extent. The mechanisms does not always seem to
work as intended and if many attacks are carried out in series during a short
period of time the OS goes into a error state, which it recovers from after
10-15 seconds. In that case the attacks are successful, but if the OS does
not go into a error state then the replay attacks are prevented by the OS.
In that case the only solution is to disconnect the OS or make it unable to
respond.
The other assumption that has to be made in order for this attack to be
carried out is that the packets between the OS and PS has to be sniffed in
some way. The first point in the attack procedure is to substitute the switch
with a hub. Since a hub forwards each packet received on all the ports it
makes it a lot easier to listen on than a switch, which only forwards packets
to the intended recipient port. If an attacker has access to the inside of the
system an insertion of a hub between the switch and the OS can be made,
so that the packets can be sniffed. An alternative is to replace the switch
with the hub but that may be more difficult to do in practice.
The success of this attack, although with some assumptions, proves that
these types of systems are vulnerable to replay attacks even if hardware that
can make it hard to accomplish this types of attacks is used.
Pending issues: How can we protect the system against this type of
attacks?
5.2.3 Unsuccessful insider attacks: Force OS forwarding
Purpose: In an attempt to be able to communicate with the inside network
from the outside (which is the Internet perspective in our case) there were
some modifications tried on the OS in order to be able to forward packets
from the outside interface to the inside. Since Windows has the packet for-
warding turned on by default some modifications had to be done.
System state prior to attack: System running in normal operational
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mode.
Attack procedure:
• The attacker connects to the outside interface.
• OS modifications by an insider:
– Registry value found in: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM
\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters
– The IPEnableRouter value has to be changed from the default 0
to 1.
– Windows Xp has to be rebooted in order for this change to take
effect.
• Some modifications of the captured packet turning the engine on were
required in order to send the out to the OS with the PS as destination.
• Various modification attempts were made in the Packet Player Builder
tool. The tampered parameters where the following:
– Source Ethernet MAC address of the packets
– Destination Ethernet MAC address of the packets
– Time To Live (TTL).
– Source IP address of the packet
– Destination IP address of the packet
– Checksum was recalculated automatically by the program
– Saved the packet in a file.
• The saved file was used in Colasoft Packet Player in an replay attack
attempt.
Background: This method of enabling IP forwarding is based on K. Salah
and M. Hamawi article [32]. The IP forwarding is done by enabling it in
the registry by changing the IPEnableRouter value to 1. Then packets can
be sent through the computer and it works as a ordinary router. That is
exactly what we need in order to send packets from the outside network to
the inside network.
The TTL field determines how many “hops” are allowed. For every host
the package passes through the TTL field has to be decreased by 1. This
field is made to prevent packets from circulating in the system with an end-
less loop, which could flood the system. The TTL field was originally set to
1 in the packet because the packet were only intended to be sent between
the OS and PS.
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Figure 5.10: Replay packet fields edited
Result: Despite various modifications tried such as changing the source
IP and MAC address of the packet to the IP and MAC address of the
attackers computer, changing the TTL from 1 to 4 and recalculating the
checksum this attack failed. This modification of the packet is shown in
Figure 5.10. The packet was sent out from the attackers computer, but the
OS did not forward it, despite the enabling of packet forwarding through
the registry change.
The reason for this may be the same seen in attempts to try to replay the
packet from the internal network, like shown in Subsection 5.2.2. In some
cases the OS prevents replay of packet by a security mechanism. Since no
documentation on the system could be received from Kongsberg Maritime
it is very hard to clearly state the security mechanism in use. In this case
there may be a lower layer protocol (under UDP/IP) that prevents packets
from the external network to go into the internal network. Like seen in
Subsection 5.2.2 when the OS was not operational the replay attacks were
successful, but in this case the option of disconnecting the OS is not possible
because the OS is used as a packet forwarding unit.
Pending issues: Could this attack have been done in another way to make
it successful and bypass the security mechanism in the OS?
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5.3 Summary
To sum up this Chapter an overview of the attacks is presented here. The
attacks are divided into two tables, containing outsider and insider attacks.
Outsider attacks are shown in Table 5.1, while insider are shown in Table
5.2. A name of each attack, the outcome, and a short description are shown.
Attack name: Outcome: Description:
Gain control over the OS Success
A weakness in the SMB protocol
was exploited using Metasploit.
A shell was planted in the OS
so that an attacker could control
the OS through that shell and en-
abled endless possibilities for re-
mote abuse.
Denial of Service Success
Half open connections in a three-
way handshake in TCP consume
resources. This is exploited by
flooding the OS with half open
connections so that resources are
consumed and the OS becomes
unable to respond to legitimate
requests.
Other Metasploit attempts Unsuccessful
Gain control over the OS was
a successful attack using the
Metasploit framework. Since the
framework contains 320 modules
the open ports and vulnerabil-
ities found in the Nessus scan
were compared and tried out.
Table 5.1: A summary of outsider attacks
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Attack name: Outcome: Description:
VNC server access for the OS Success
The password for the VNC server
on the OS is stored in the reg-
istry, in a hash encrypted 3DES.
This is a weak encryption en-
abling the password to be found
and an attacker can take remote
control over the OS along with
mouse, keyboard and real time
screen view.
Packet replay through a switch Success
This attack assumes previously
captured packets between the OS
and PS. A replay of those pack-
ets can result in an insider forc-
ing system behavior that is not
initialized by the OS.
Force OS forwarding Unsuccessful
Since the OS has 3 network cards
communication between the out-
side and the inside network is
hard. A registry value on the
OS was attempted changed to be
able to communicate between the
networks.
Table 5.2: A summary of insider attacks
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Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 Answers to research questions
In this section we will try to answer the research questions presented in
Section 1.1. Although the answers to these questions are spread throughout
the thesis, we will discuss them and try to provide appropriate answers to
them jointly in the following Subsections.
6.1.1 Is it possible to get useful information about the sys-
tem that can be used in attacks later on?
In order to be able to attack any ICS or ICT system, information about the
system must be collected in advance. If the answer to this question would
have been no, then attacks on the system would be very difficult to carry
out, since an attack in such a case would have to have been based on general
knowledge about typical systems and system implementations only, rather
than specific system knowledge and details about the specific set up and
parameters used in the case we are investigating. However, in our case the
answer to this question is yes and the thorough answer is mainly found in
Chapter 4. Here is a summary of some of the main points from that chapter
For the purpose of finding information about the system a scanning tool
was used. The tool used was Nessus and it was configured to look for known
vulnerabilities such as open ports, services running, protocols available etc.
Known vulnerabilities in Windows along with all of the components that
belongs to it were also scanned for. All the available plugins in the HomeFeed
version of Nessus were tried, which gave the results shown in Chapter 4.
This thesis focuses on attacks from the Internet that can be made on
a PCS. For this system, the main component that can be attacked is the
OS. The reason for this is that it is strategically placed as the first and only
component seen from an Internet perspective. Therefore the OS was the
main and only target of the Nessus scan. A direct connection to the other
components of the system from an Internet perspective could not be made
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for reasons we will describe in further detail in the following Subsection
6.1.3.
The results of the Nessus scan showed 13 open ports, 2 medium level
vulnerabilities and 26 low level vulnerabilities. In addition the scan collected
information about the OS, such as the operating system, computer name,
workgroup and even the physical MAC address. All this information was
used in Chapter 5 for the attacks.
As often is the case, the technical system information we obtained from
the relevant industry regarding the laboratory system were sparse. Hence
we had to settle for the system information obtained by Nessus. This was
very unfortunate because if documentation on the components could be
obtained, it could have given ideas on ways to attack the system. Especially
information about the interactions of the system and protocol information.
Despite the fact that documentation could not be obtained, the informa-
tion collected in the Nessus scan was enough to carry out several successful
attacks on the PCS.
6.1.2 Can the system be penetrated from the Internet and
in that case what damage can an attacker do?
This question was the main motivation for writing this thesis. To be able
to answer it, the scan of the system had to be used as a background for
possible vulnerabilities in the system to exploit and it gave ideas about how
to penetrate the system. System information from the scans such as open
ports, known vulnerabilities and protocols used were matched up against
tools like Metasploit framework, DoS attacks, replay attacks, vulnerability
databases and other sources of information. After countless attempts some
of the attacks were successful. The attacks along with the configuration of
various attack tools used, procedures and results are described throughout
Chapter 5. The main points along with a discussion are presented here.
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the main point of the attacks
was the OS. The OS could in fact be penetrated from the Internet. For this
the Metasploit framework was used and a vulnerability in the SMB protocol
vas exploited to plant a shell that was controlled by the attacker. This was a
very serious security breach and enabled the attacker access to information
about the system, processes running on it, registry and much more. The
attacker could even execute commands on the OS, terminate processes, shut
down the OS, restart the OS and even upload and download files. This gave
many possibilities for exploitation.
The successful Metasploit attack shows how important patching of the
operating system is and the possibilities a successful attack of this kind opens
up, such as remote control of the attacked OS through a shell. Another
attack that cannot be fixed by a simple patching of the system and is much
more difficult to protect against is the DoS attack. The Netwag toolbox
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faked the source IP address and made it random for each packet, in addition
to the fact that it made a half open connection by sending a SYN and not
replying to it by an ACK, which consumed resources on the OS. DoS attacks
are in general very hard to protect against. One way is to filter and shut out
the flooding source addresses, but in this case this is not possible. A DDoS
attack which is done by several attackers at the same time is even more
dangerous and can make the target totally flooded so it cannot respond to
legitimate requests.
In addition to looking at penetration from the Internet perspective some
attacks were described that require an inside attacker as well. We have
learned from our background studies presented in Section 2.2 that insiders
are accountable for over 50% of the security breaches in an ICS. Therefore
the knowledge of an insider (like an employee) can be priceless in attacking
our PCS.
Since VNC enables remote control of the OS any user with the password
of the VNC server on the OS can control it and all of the units controlled by
the OS. In our case this means total control of the laboratory system. By
exploiting that the password is stored as a hash in the registry and that the
hash is compressed by a 3DES encryption an insider can decrypt it. Cain &
Abel program enables reversing of a hash encrypted with 3DES. In our case
this was successful and we could get remote access and control over the OS.
If an insider could obtain this password he or she could use it for private
purposes or even sell it. The value of such information could be very high,
depending on the system that was remotely controlled by the VNC. Terrorist
groups, foreign spies or attackers with malicious intents would probably be
very interested in gaining control over an OS in e.g. the power grid. An
example of this type of industrial espionage was described in Section 2.2.
Another successful insider attack was done by demonstrating that the
replay attack is also possible through a switch, not only a hub. There are
two assumptions in this case, which are that the packet intended for replay
has to be captured in advance and the second one is that the OS has to be
non-responding. The second assumption can be achieved by continuously
repeating the replay attack (although there is a certain point of uncertainty
in doing that as described by Szostak [34]). The first assumption can be
achieved by adding a hub e.g. between the OS and the other components
so that the traffic can be listened to and captured to be replayed on a later
point in time. An insider has access to the system and can fulfill these
assumptions. If this replay attack is successful an insider can control vital
parts of a PCS system like an engine unit in our case or in an industrial
case a valve to a nuclear power plant for instance. Unsupervised control of
an insider in this case can have disastrous consequences.
Now we will try to sum up the various types of attacks from both an
Internet perspective and an insider perspective. There are many different
possibilities of cyber attacks. By merging COTS with ICS there has been
54
opened up opportunities for exchanging of information between ICS that
are separated by huge distances and remote control of industrial plants that
was never possible before.
The merging of COTS and ICS also results in introduction of several
of the weaknesses of COTS into previously isolated ICS. As shown in this
thesis, a PCS which is a part of an ICS can pose a threat to the security.
Although the security mechanisms in this laboratory PCS may not resemble
the ones that are used in the industry today, the ICS control parts of the
critical infrastructure, and the security requirements for such systems should
be a priority.
Not only the use of COTS is responsible for the change of the threat
scenario and the consequential to the change of the security in an ICS. Also
the introduction of new information transfer technologies such as wireless
devices, usb pins and other units can produce backdoors into systems that
are normally considered trustworthy. Therefore companies have to have
clear guidelines and rules on how to use and secure the new technologies.
6.1.3 What kind of security mechanisms can be found look-
ing at the system from an outside attacker using the
Internet?
To answer this question we have to look at the whole system. The PCS
described here has many components that prevent intrusion. The main
component that provides security is the hardware firewall. It is configured by
NTNU, so it is not part of the system provided by Kongsberg Maritime but
still it protects the system against intrusions from the outside network. The
firewall is configured so that it limits the communication between the OS and
the Internet to addresses that are within the NTNU domain (129.241.—.—).
In that way students using the laboratory have enough information to reach
internal sites and e-mail, but cannot enter potentially harmful sites. On the
other hand communication from the Internet (even with a NTNU domain
address) to the system is not possible. The hardware firewall prevents all
communication from the outside to the PCS. Even simple ping requests are
not possible from the outside as described in Appendix A. This is done to
separate the system from the outside world. The hardware firewall can be
considered a security mechanism although it did not come with the system
originally, but similar systems in the industry are usually operating behind
firewalls.
Another security mechanism in the system are the three different network
cards on the OS. There is no way to communicate with the PS from the
Internet without reconfiguring some of the settings on the OS. The reason
for this is that Windows does not allow communication transfer between
network cards on a machine by default. It is possible to turn it on but as
described in Subsection 5.2.3 this forwarding of information between network
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cards did not lead to a successful attack. So even if an attacker could
somehow bypass the hardware firewall it would be very difficult to enter or
even communicate with the inside network (between the OS and PS).
There are also security mechanisms on the inside network that prevent
attacks. As described in Subsection 5.2.2 there is a mechanism in the OS
that prevents replay attacks. Due to the fact that sometimes the replay
attack works and sometimes it does not, it is very hard to determine what
security mechanisms are embedded in the OS without having any documen-
tation available about it. The security mechanisms may be on a lower layer
than UDP/IP because the forwarding of replay packages from the outside
interface to the inside was unsuccessful.
To summarize, the security mechanisms in this system are present but
there are ways to bypass them, for example by exploiting a weak password
hash in the VNC.
6.2 Reflections after the attacks
This section contains some reflections after the attacks. The unanswered
questions throughout the thesis are discussed here, things that could have
been done to find out more and things that could have been done different
by the industry. A suggestion on further work wraps up this Section.
6.2.1 Unanswered questions
Through the thesis there were some unanswered questions. From Section 4.1
the questions were “Can we exploit this? If we can, then how?” regarding
the system scans of the OS made through Nessus. In Chapter 5 some of
the vulnerabilities found in the scan were successfully exploited but still the
majority of the vulnerabilities were not exploited. One of the reasons may
be that most of the vulnerabilities found were low level vulnerabilities, which
means that they are not considered as critical for the security of the system.
They may pose a threat to the security of the system but it is considered
very low.
In Chapter 5 there were several unanswered questions. In Subsection
5.1.1 remote control of the OS is gained by exploiting a vulnerability in the
SMB protocol and the question asked is “How do we protect the system
against these types of attacks?”. In this case the answer is simple. A patch
of the operating system has to be applied in order to prevent that type of
attacks. Operative system vulnerabilities constantly are found and spoken
of in various forums on the Internet. Software tools are made to exploit
those vulnerabilities. Therefore the only way to protect against this type
of exploitation is to keep track of the new patches available and update the
system on a regular basis.
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In Subsection 5.1.2 a DoS attack was described. Afterwards the same
question of “How can we protect the system against this type of attack?”
was raised. This time the answer to the question is not that simple. Filtering
and exclusion of IP addresses that are flooding the network is one way the
server side can protect it self against it, but there are two problems with that
type of protection. The network is flooded with packets even though the
server do not reply to the packets. The second problem is that an attacker
can forge the source address and hence the blocking become less effective.
According to RFC 2267 [20] one way to protect against this types of attacks
is to make the Internet Service Provider (ISP) restrict the source addresses
of the packets sent by the user to only the address space allowed by the
user. This would effectively eliminate DoS attack but requires filtering by
the ISPs. An active detection mechanism implemented in the network by
the ISPs would also make it easy to localize the attackers that flooded the
network or attempted to flood it with DoS attacks.
Subsection 5.1.3 raised the question “Are there other Metasploit attacks
that could work?”. Since there are 320 modules available in Metasploit that
can be used for exploitation, the answer to the question can be said to be
yes, with high probability. Due to the limited time available, only some of
the modules of Metasploit were tested. The ones selected were based on the
Nessus scan results.
Now the focus is changed to attacks from the inside. In Subsection 5.2.1
the question “How do we protect the OS against these types of attacks?”
was raised again. The answer to it would be to use a different type of
VNC server or just disable the VNC server. Since the VNC server used,
stores the password in the registry and uses a weak encryption, it poses
a serious threat to the security of the OS and also the whole system in
this case since the system is indeed totally controlled by the OS. If a VNC
server is required, then another type should be used that preferably does not
use 3DES encryption but more secure encryption standards like Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) or others. Preferably, the VNC server should
be disabled because it enables remote control over a vital element in a PCS
and even the best security cannot prevent human errors which can have
very serious consequences. One obvious hazards is that the password may
get into the hands of an attacker with a malicious intent.
In the last successful attack in Subsection 5.2.2 the question “How can
we protect the system against this type of attacks?” was asked for the last
time. One of the possibilities is to eliminate the necessary preconditions that
were assumed present for the attack. Physical protection of the connection
cables between the OS and PS for the purpose of preventing sniffing on them
is one possibility. Another is to improve the replay protection in the OS so
that it is impossible for an attacker to carry out this attack. The replay
protection in the OS worked sometimes, but other times the OS went to a
state where it recovered from an error. Therefore the results of these attacks
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could not be determined with absolute certainty. If the OS prevented the
replay attacks every time it would prevent this types of attacks.
The question asked in Subsection 5.2.3 was “Could this attack have been
done in another way to make it successful and bypass the security mechanism
in the OS?”. Due to limited time there was not much room to experiment any
further with this type of forwarding attack interconnecting the outside and
inside networks of the PCS. An alternative to making this attack successful
and bypassing the security mechanism in the OS would be to physically
connect an additional network node element (like a hub or a switch) instead
of the OS. This is shown in Figure 6.1. It would require physical access
to the system and would eliminate the OS as the only component that is
connected to the outside network. In practice this remake of the network
setup would should be discovered pretty quickly, at least in an organization
with a functioning quality control management.
Figure 6.1: System remake to make forwarding between networks possible
6.2.2 What could have been done to find out more?
Since this was a laboratory setting, the system had very strict firewall set-
tings as described in the former Subsection 6.1.3. The network administra-
tors along with the staff responsible for the laboratory has set very strict
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settings on the hardware firewall to protect it from attacks from the Inter-
net. This prevented testing from the outside of the hardware firewall, but
in a real life setting in the industry the hardware firewall could be less strict
as in this laboratory setting. Communication with the outside world would
be possible to a greater extent. Then it would have been very interesting
to do penetration testing on the firewall to see what kind of restrictions are
used in the configuration and this information could be used as a basis for
further vulnerability testing.
In this thesis the Nessus scan provided more than enough information for
testing of various vulnerabilities. For more extended testing of the system
several additional tools could have been used. The tools from the back-
ground Section 2.3 could be used for more thorough scanning and system
survey, such as Nmap, IP stack integrity checker and Ethereal.
The attack possibilities on ICS and especially COTS products such as
Microsoft Windows are known to the public and exposed by the media on
a large scale. Albeit the attack possibilities are numerous, for this thesis
they were restricted to the possibilities shown in the nessus scan. There
are certainly possibilities for other attacks. Some of the other attack tools
that could be used are the once described in the background Section 2.3.
Tools such as Hydra, Fuzzers and Wikto would be very interesting to test
in greater depth on this laboratory. Some of the tools already used such as
Metasploit and Netwox would also be interesting to do further testing with,
but due to time constrains only some of the possibilities the tools allow
were tried. The iOpener tool would be very interesting to test as well, but
unfortunately we were unable to obtain it.
6.2.3 What could have been done different by the industry?
In this subsection we present some improvements the industry can do based
on the results from this thesis. Some of the improvements are so general
that they can be applied to most ICT systems, while some are more specific
for ICS and PCS.
Unpatched systems can be abused by attackers. This is a real threat to
many ICT systems today because there is usually a time difference between
a vulnerability is found in a system, e.g. an operative system, and the time
until a patch for it is developed and installed by the system administrator.
In some cases the administrator is not even aware that there is a new patch
to apply, like in the example from background Section 2.2 with the nuclear
plant attacked by a worm, due to a unpatched system. Hence administrators
have to constantly keep track of the latest patches and be aware of the
vulnerabilities their systems may have.
Firewall filtering rules should be set. This should be done to minimize
the possible ways to exploit the system. The open ports of the firewall
should be monitored and given special attention. In our laboratory system
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the VNC server posed a vulnerability threat. Close monitoring of the VNC,
or totally disabling it, would be advisable. Since the system described in the
thesis is only a laboratory system used mainly by students, the consequences
of a security breach in the system may not be so great. On the other hand,
if a system used in the industry was running a similar VNC server and was
victim of an attack, it could have other results. An ICS may have control
over parts of the critical infrastructure and if used for malicious reasons,
there can be very serious consequences.
DoS attacks are a threat for many ICS. A cooperation with the ISP
could be made to monitor the nodes on the network and if possible shut out
or prevent an attackers trying to carry out DoS attacks. This can be done
by the ISP by reject packets with a source address other than the client’s.
If large amounts of traffic is generated, monitoring systems can be used to
shut out the possible attacker.
In our system a replay protection mechanism was implemented and used
in the OS. The results of the attack in Subsection 5.2.2 showed that the
security mechanism in the OS did not work every time. This may be an
issue because it allows an attacker to replay packets and potentially control
units without the authorization of the OS. However the laboratory system
does not fully resemble the system used by Kongsberg Maritime, and may
be lacking some of the security mechanisms implemented in the live systems.
IDS systems can be used by the ICS to monitor the networks and dis-
cover possible attacks. This requires additional equipment and training of
personnel, but the benefits of having an IDS can be very great. In addition
log records should be made continuously to ensure that if intrusions are de-
tected, they are also documented. The log records could be used later on to
reset the system to a previous state if changes are made. Log records them-
selves are obvious targets of attacks as well, so they too should be protected
by the IDS systems.
Tight security on the computer systems is not enough to prevent un-
wanted incidents from happening. Guidelines have to be defined to tell the
users of the system how to act and prevent their behavior from compromis-
ing the security of the whole system. An open door to the server room or a
weak password are examples of things that can be used by an intruder as a
basis for an attack.
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6.2.4 Further work
This topic has partly been covered in the previous Subsections but can be
summarized here. The following topics could have been gone thoroughly
into:
• System scans (Nmap, IP stack integrity checker, Ethereal).
• New attack tools tried (Hydra, Fuzzers, Wikto and iOpener).
• Used toolboxes (such as Metasploit and Netwox) tried in other type
of attacks.
• Other attacks tried such as DDos attack.
• Fuzzing framework used to force abnormal behavior from the system.
• IDS set up and tested.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
PCS are used to control parts of the critical infrastructure of society, such as
electric utilities, petroleum , water, waste, chemicals and pharmaceuticals
amongst others. If the PCS become victims of cyber attacks, this can have
severe consequences. The consequences may involve health and safety of
human lives as well as having a huge impact on national and global economy.
Since the merging of COTS and PCS, the previously isolated PCS now face
new types of threats due to well-known flaws in COTS, as well as being
connected to the Internet. Therefore the focus on securing PCS and ICS in
general should get increased attention.
In this thesis the laboratory system used was a scaled down PCS that
could be tested on without any serious consequences. The laboratory system
was delivered by Kongsberg Maritime. The OS is the first unit an attacker
from the outside has contact with and it is used for controlling the other
components of the system, therefore the OS is the main source of attention
in this thesis. A scan was made on the OS to map the vulnerabilities of the
OS. The scan was used as a basis for the attacks. Attacks were divided into
attacks from the outside (Internet) and attacks from the inside.
Under the circumstances of the testing on the laboratory PCS, many
of the attacks tried were successful. A shell was planted in the OS, so an
attacker could control it remotely, DoS attack flooded the OS and forced
it to halt for a few seconds, VNC password was found enabling remote
view and control of the OS, replay of packets was successful on the inside
of the system making a man in the middle scenario possible. Despite the
fact that the laboratory system may not have all the security mechanisms
implemented, as the PCS systems in the industry does, the fact that the
attacks on the laboratory system are possible may seem a bit disturbing.
To prevent from the types of attacks described in this thesis steps has
to be taken. Some of the prevention steps can be to regularly patch the
system, use firewall filtering, monitor nodes in case of DoS, IDS monitoring
and guidelines on system use.
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Appendix A
Lab problems
Lab work 14.3:
There were problems with the internet connection. When I tried using the
OS for connecting to the internet it was not possible. To solve this problem,
the internet cable from the OS had to use another socket than the one used
originally. I discovered that certain sockets in the wall enabled internet con-
nection while some were only meant for local use. The socket in the wall
was changed from 754 to 753. Then connection to the web pages of NTNU
was possible but other pages on the internet was stil not impossible. The
reason for this may be restrictions of connections set by the administrators
of the system.
These restrictions may be a problem in further work and has to be dis-
cussed with the administrators of the system to see if it may cause problems
for the tests I am going to run on the system.
The IP on the outgoing connection in the network settings of the OS is
set to 10.122.10.5 which is a local IP address. When I tried to ping it from
my computer the ip was translated to 129.241.187.1 which seems more cor-
rect. This may be a problem as well because I am not sure how to determine
if that is the correct IP address and even if it is there seems to be a firewall
turned on that may prohibit some of my tests as well.
Another thing discovered was that if OS and my computer are connected to
sockets next to each other the connection fails on both of them. To solve
this OS is connected to socket 753 and my laptop is on 755.
Labwork 1.4:
Breakthrough on the possible IP address. Using the nslookup command
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in the command prompt window on the OS I got the following information:
Default Server: kyb-ad01.ad.itk.ntnu.no
Address: 129.241.10.17
After further testing it turns out that this is the IP address of the dns
server, not the OS. This test gave birth to a new idea on how to determine
the external IP address. A ping was tried on the OS name kyb-aim01 with
the address: kyb-aim01.ad.itk.ntnu.no. The request timed out (hence no
reply from the OS) but I did not get any error messages about the address,
which was shown as
129.241.187.83
Labwork 12.5:
This IP address also turned out to be the wrong one since the OS name is
kyb-aim02 not kyb-aim01 according to the Nessus scan. When I tried to ping
kyb-aim02.ad.itk.ntnu.no only the local IP address of the OS (10.122.10.5)
came up. Therefore the global IP address could not be determined due to
strict security configurations in the hardware firewall. When a ping request
is attempted on the OS from the outside of the firewall it is unreachable,
but if the ping is sent from the same subnetwork (hence behind the firewall)
the ping returns the local IP address.
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Appendix B
Details about tools used
B.1 Nessus scan details
Here are the details of the configuration settings applied to Nessus, a long
with the full results and comments:
The options for the scan were set to make a safe scan of the system,
without the risk of shutting it down or creating any sort of complications
for it. The LaBrea scan was not used due to the fact that a PCS system
should not have honey pots that attracts attacks on it. The options set for
the scan are shown in Figure B.1.
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Figure B.1: Nessus scan options
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Figure B.2 shows that all the plugins available in the “HomeFeed” version
of Nessus are used. Therefore it makes the testing a bit slow but since the
test it is done on only one host it is manageable.
Figure B.2: Nessus scan plugins used
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In case a congestion in the scan the total number of scans ran in parallel
is reduced. This option was turned on during the scan like shown in Figure
B.3.
Figure B.3: Nessus network options
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CGI scanning is enabled. It searches for well-known vulnerabilities in
web servers and off-the-shelf web application software. Thorough tests is
also turned on to make the testing more detailed. This option usually slows
the system down a bit but since there is only one host scanned in our case it
does not have a big impact on the scan time. This is shown in Figure B.4.
Figure B.4: Advanced Nessus options
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The overview result of the scan is shown in Figure B.5. It shows 26 low
level vulnerabilities, 2 medium level vulnerabilities and 13 open ports found
on the OS. A more detailed description of each one will follow.
Figure B.5: Nessus scan overview
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First of the two medium level vulnerabilities is shown in Figure B.6. It
states that it may be possible to bypass firewall rules since the remote host
does not discard TCP SYN packets which have the FIN flag set.
Figure B.6: Syn and Fin can be set to bypass firewall rules
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The second medium level vulnerability is displayed in Figure B.7 and
indicates that the VNC server running on the Os may be security risk.
Figure B.7: VNC server
Remainder of the low level vulnerabilities are sorted by the port number
used. A TFTPD is listening on port 69 like shown in Figure B.8.
Figure B.8: TFTPD is running on Port 69
72
Figure B.9 shows that a NTP server is listening on port 123.
Figure B.9: NTP server is listening on port 123
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Port 135 is used by a Windows RPC service like shown in Figure B.10.
Figure B.10: Windows RPC service is in use
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The OS uses port 137 for NetBIOS nbtscan requests like shown in Figure
B.11.
Figure B.11: NetBIOS in use
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Figure B.12 shows that a SMB server is running on port 139.
Figure B.12: SMB in use
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Port 445 is used for file and resource sharing and allows information
about the OS. This is shown in Figure B.13
Figure B.13: Port 445 overview
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Other services that port 445 is used for are shown in Figure B.14 and
Figure B.15
Figure B.14: SMB log in
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Figure B.15: SMB null session log in
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For port 3389 Windows Terminal Services are enabled, like displayed in
Figure B.16
Figure B.16: Windows Terminal Services running
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Port 5800 is listening for a VNC web server. HTTP settings are enabled,
as shown in Figure B.17.
Figure B.17: VNC server running
81
A VNC server is listening on port 5900 but with slightly possibilities, as
shown in Figure B.18.
Figure B.18: VNC on port 5900
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A Sentinel Protection server is running on port 6002. This is shown in
Figure B.19
Figure B.19: Sentinel web server running
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Additional information about the HTTP protocol in use on port 6002 is
shown in Figure B.20
Figure B.20: Protocol in use on the Sentinel server
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The last three ports (7000, 7001 and 7777) are used for a fileserver, a
callback to the cach manager and Cbt services. Very little information could
be recieved about them from the Nessus scan, like shown in Figure B.21
Figure B.21: Information on the last three open ports
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Additional information could also be received not regarding the use of
ports, such as the fact that ICMP protocol was in use. This is shown in
Figure B.22
Figure B.22: ICMP protocol
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Some information was fetched by Nessus over the TCP protocol. The
information is displayed in Figure B.23 and B.24. The information fetched
tells:
• the OS can be pinged.
• timestamps are in use.
• the host name is displayed.
• the operative system type a long with a certainty level.
• information about the scan.
Figure B.23: TCP information
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Figure B.24: Additional TCP info
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A UDP traceroute is shown in Figure B.25. Since the attacking pc is
connected through a switch the trace route only shows the two addresses (of
the attacker and the OS), without any additional hops required.
Figure B.25: UDP trace route
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B.2 Cain & Abel details
Cain & Abel was in our case used of decryption of the VNC password. As
described in Subsection 5.2.1 the passowrd was stored in the registery of
the OS. The password is encrypted using triple DES algorithm, hashed and
stored in Hexadecimals. Cain & Abel uses rainbow tables to nearly instantly
find the password. Rainbow tables are tables of already cracked hashes [15].
This makes it very efficient to find the cleartext passwords from hashed
passwords.
Figure B.26 shows the overview of the Cain & Abel passowrd finding.
The password hash a long with the cleartext of the password was censored
due to privacy reasons of the laboratory.
Figure B.26: 3DES reverse decryption
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